# Sunrise Hospital answered evidence board - source file

**Facility:** Sunrise Hospital and Medical Center, Las Vegas, Nevada  
**CCN:** 290003  
**Edition:** August 25, 2026  

This export intentionally contains only answered, partially answered, analytical, or not-applicable board questions. Unanswered research prompts and failed-lookups are omitted from the public edition; omission does not convert them into negative findings.

## What does the latest verified record establish?

### Is Sunrise a nonprofit hospital that files an IRS Form 990?

**Status:** confirmed

No. Sunrise Hospital and Medical Center, LLC is a proprietary, for-profit hospital inside HCA Healthcare’s public-company chain, so the relevant public financial sources are Nevada facility reports, CMS records, and HCA SEC filings rather than Form 990.

**Analysis:** This prevents nonprofit charity rules and Schedule J or Schedule R reporting duties from being assigned to the wrong legal entity.

**Connection:** Identity comes before every claim about profit, executive pay, investments, taxes, or related organizations.

**Sources:** S1 · S2 · S4 · S6 · HCA 2025 Form 10-K

### Did Sunrise report a positive financial result in 2025?

**Status:** confirmed

Yes. Nevada facility reporting shows $220.50 million of net income in 2025 and a calculated 17.55% facility margin. This is a facility accounting result, not unrestricted cash and not HCA’s consolidated result.

**Analysis:** The six-year record does not support calling Sunrise durably broke, while the money-type boundary prevents a reported margin from becoming a claim about cash available for any particular purpose.

**Connection:** This is the correct local financial comparison for the nurse-pay allegation.

**Sources:** Nevada Compare Care annual financial workbook, Sunrise Hospital, CY2025

### Was HCA financially profitable while Sunrise workers raised pay concerns?

**Status:** confirmed

Yes. HCA reported $75.60 billion in 2025 revenue and $6.784 billion in net income attributable to HCA, an 8.97% calculated net margin, while also reporting $10.067 billion of share repurchases and $679 million of dividends.

**Analysis:** These parent figures establish consolidated financial capacity and capital-allocation priorities; they do not prove that a Sunrise dollar funded a repurchase or that all parent cash was available for local wages.

**Connection:** The fair question is how a profitable parent balanced workforce, capital, debt, and shareholder returns.

**Sources:** HCA Healthcare 2025 Form 10-K

### Did Sunrise improve nurse hiring before the latest capacity warning?

**Status:** confirmed

Yes. Sunrise reported an RN vacancy rate of 28% with 465 openings in 2022, improving to 5.77% with 63 openings in 2024; objection/refusal forms also fell from 108 to 57.

**Analysis:** This is meaningful favorable counterevidence. It shows that the staffing story is not a simple uninterrupted decline.

**Connection:** The improvement must be reported alongside 2025 volume and staffing pressure.

**Sources:** S16 · S17

### Did the 2025 record still show a staffing-capacity warning?

**Status:** confirmed

Yes. Annual admissions rose 4.38% while combined fourth-quarter RN FTE fell 3.03% in the facility reports.

**Analysis:** A volume-up and staffing-down divergence is a capacity warning, not proof that a particular shift violated a ratio or caused a patient injury.

**Connection:** This is the strongest current bridge between the labor complaint and the patient-access story.

**Sources:** Nevada Compare Care annual utilization and staffing workbooks, CY2024-CY2025

### What did the 2021 Leapfrog C grade actually measure?

**Status:** confirmed

It was an overall hospital safety grade covering infections, surgery, safety practices, safety problems, and doctors, nurses, and staff - not a standalone infection grade. The archived report showed below-average MRSA, serious postoperative breathing problems, pressure sores, and qualified-nurse scoring, while blood infection and colon surgical-infection measures were favorable.

**Analysis:** The grade supports scrutiny, but the favorable components and historical period prevent an all-infections-failing claim.

**Connection:** The same record can contain a middling headline grade and real areas of strength.

**Sources:** Archived official Leapfrog Hospital Safety Grade, Spring 2021

### Has the headline Leapfrog grade improved recently?

**Status:** confirmed

The official grade history shows C in both Spring and Fall of 2023, 2024, and 2025.

**Analysis:** Repeated C grades justify asking what remained unresolved, but component measures and methods change and should be checked by period.

**Connection:** This is a persistent middling signal, not a mortality count.

**Sources:** Official Leapfrog Hospital Safety Grade history for Sunrise

### Was Sunrise the second-highest patient-lawsuit filer among the 100 hospitals studied?

**Status:** confirmed

No. Sunrise ranked second for its approximately 12.94-times average list-price markup. The Johns Hopkins and Axios dataset gave Sunrise an A predatory debt-collection grade and recorded zero court actions, lawsuits, garnishments, liens, and dollars pursued from January 2018 through July 2020.

**Analysis:** The markup is a pricing red flag, while the debt-collection result is favorable counterevidence. List prices can be negotiation anchors and do not prove that a particular patient paid 12.94 times cost.

**Connection:** This corrects the most important conflation in the public narrative: markup rank is not lawsuit rank.

**Sources:** S35 · Axios hospital billing interactive · Nevada Current summary

### Does current mortality data support claiming that Sunrise caused excess deaths?

**Status:** confirmed

No. Current CMS condition-specific mortality measures show no condition worse than the national result, with two better and six no different.

**Analysis:** The defensible harm story is access, communication, readmissions, satisfaction, and capacity - not a fabricated death count.

**Connection:** This favorable mortality evidence is a mandatory publication boundary.

**Sources:** S19 · S20 · S21 · S22

### What positive quality findings should appear beside the warnings?

**Status:** confirmed

Lown reports Outcomes A and Safety A for Sunrise, and CMS mortality is not worse than national on the reviewed condition measures. The 2021 Leapfrog archive also showed favorable blood-infection and colon surgical-infection measures.

**Analysis:** Different ratings use different periods and methods, so the honest conclusion is mixed quality rather than universally unsafe care.

**Connection:** Counterevidence makes the warning more credible by showing exactly what the data does and does not support.

**Sources:** S20 · S23 · archived Leapfrog Spring 2021 report

### Has Sunrise invested in local facilities and construction?

**Status:** confirmed

Yes. Sunrise reported $47.30 million of 2023 capital spending, including expansion and equipment, and $26.09 million of construction in progress in 2025; its property book also increased during the reviewed period.

**Analysis:** Capital investment is a positive local-value finding. Restricted or capital-purpose funds should not be treated automatically as an interchangeable wage budget.

**Connection:** The accountability question is whether physical expansion translated into staffed clinical capacity.

**Sources:** S5 · S6 · S12 · Nevada Compare Care CY2025 balance sheet

### What local role does Sunrise perform?

**Status:** confirmed

Sunrise is an 834-bed teaching hospital and regional trauma center with 44,983 inpatient admissions reported in 2025; more than one-third of 2024 admissions were Medicaid.

**Analysis:** Its scale and Medicaid role are genuine community value and also increase the consequences of access or staffing failures.

**Connection:** The hospital’s public value is why its financial and staffing priorities deserve unusually close scrutiny.

**Sources:** S5 · S6

## Where did the money go?

### What did the hospital actually earn in total, and from whom — revenue by payer mix, year over year?

**Status:** partial

Sunrise reported net results of +$19.36m (2020), +$65.59m (2021), +$55.51m (2022), −$4.29m (2023), and +$192.32m (2024). Total operating revenue is confirmed at $885.70m in 2023 and $1.192bn in 2024. In 2024, admission volume was 36.17% Medicaid, 36.45% Medicare, 21.31% commercial, and 5.71% self-pay/private/charity categories.

**Analysis:** The payer percentages are patient-count shares, not revenue shares. A dollar-by-payer trend cannot be inferred because Medicare, Medicaid, and commercial cases pay different rates and have different acuity.

**Connection:** Connects high Medicaid volume to the real possibility of local operating pressure without proving parent-level poverty.

**Sources:** S5 · S6

### Are quoted numbers system-wide or hospital-specific — and does the entity scope match?

**Status:** confirmed

The $4.29m 2023 loss, $192.32m 2024 profit, and $47.30m 2023 capital spend are Sunrise facility figures. HCA’s $5.242bn 2023 net income, $3.811bn buybacks, and $661m dividends are consolidated parent figures.

**Analysis:** The parent figures show consolidated capacity and control priorities. They do not prove Sunrise cash paid for shareholder returns.

**Connection:** This entity split is the foundation for every financial conclusion on the page.

**Sources:** S5 · S6 · S9

### What does every Schedule R affiliate hold?

**Status:** not-applicable

Sunrise is for-profit and does not file Form 990 or Schedule R.

**Analysis:** The correct substitute is HCA’s SEC subsidiary list plus LLC financials, intercompany agreements, property records, captive statements, and benefit-plan filings.

**Connection:** Routes the investigation through public-company documents instead of nonprofit forms.

**Sources:** S4 · S9

### What dividends, distributions, management fees, or intercompany sweeps left?

**Status:** partial

Sunrise recorded HCA home-office allocations of $36.51m in 2022, $36.30m in 2023, and $39.20m in 2024 — $112.01m total. HCA paid $661m in dividends and repurchased $3.811bn of shares in 2023 at consolidated scope. No Sunrise dividend or cash sweep was traced.

**Analysis:** Home-office allocations may pay for legitimate centralized IT, compliance, finance, purchasing, and management. Their economic character cannot be judged without the cost pool and cash settlement.

**Connection:** This is the strongest quantified control-channel finding, with an explicit innocent explanation.

**Sources:** S6 · S9

### What was spent on construction and expansion, and was it restricted?

**Status:** partial

Sunrise reported $47.304m of 2023 capital: $12.089m expansion, $3.825m equipment, and $31.390m other capital. A contractor describes a $130m tower program. Funding restrictions were not disclosed.

**Analysis:** Capital spending shows investment, not poverty. It cannot automatically be converted into a claim that the same dollars could legally fund wages.

**Connection:** Connects growing admissions and ED volume to a plausible capacity rationale while asking whether the build created staffed capacity.

**Sources:** S5 · S12

## Who runs the hospital?

### What conflicts are documented — related transactions, vendor ownership, or Open Payments?

**Status:** partial

HCA disclosed CEO-relative employment at parent scope. No complete Sunrise conflict, vendor-ownership, or Open Payments crosswalk was completed.

**Analysis:** The disclosed relationship is evidence of transparency; independence and comparability review remain untested.

**Connection:** Connects executive money to governance approvals.

**Sources:** S15

### Who owns the operator — the full dated chain?

**Status:** confirmed

Sunrise Hospital and Medical Center, LLC → AC Med, LLC → Healthtrust, Inc.–The Hospital Company → HCA Inc. → HCA Healthcare, Inc. Historical succession includes American Medicorp, Humana/Galen, Columbia, and HCA.

**Analysis:** Current ownership is public-company control, not current PE ownership. HCA’s 2006–2011 sponsor period is historical.

**Connection:** Sets the correct accountability route: public-company capital allocation and controlled subsidiaries.

**Sources:** S4 · S10 · S11

### Who was supposed to stop this — and what did each actually do?

**Status:** confirmed

Sunrise/HCA management and its governing body controlled billing, staffing, ADA access, contracting, and allocations. OIG challenged Medicare billing; DOJ enforced disability access; Clark County enforced air permits; NLRB certified the union and is processing a labor allegation; Nevada collects staffing and financial reports.

**Analysis:** Oversight was not absent. It was fragmented: each regulator sees a narrow ledger, while no public body reconciles parent capital allocation, local staffing pressure, contracts, and patient access.

**Connection:** Turns “regulatory failure” into a documented fragmentation problem rather than a claim that nobody acted.

**Sources:** S16 · S17 · S25 · S27 · S28 · S30 · S33

## Patient safety receipts

### How many temporary or travel clinicians work here?

**Status:** partial

Contracted RN FTE was 138.3 in Q4 2022, 80.0 in 2023, and 60.0 in 2024. Unique people, other specialties, and annual FTE equivalents were not disclosed.

**Analysis:** Contracted RN reliance fell, but a quarterly FTE snapshot cannot identify turnover or unique travelers.

**Connection:** Challenges an agency-spike narrative while preserving the contractor-data gap.

**Sources:** S6

### What are ED median time and left-without-being-seen trends?

**Status:** partial

CMS reports a 164-minute median ED visit for July 2024–June 2025. The left-before-seen display is 0 for CY2024 with a 183,146 sample, but it may be rounded. Trend and national comparison were not extracted.

**Analysis:** The measure supports access burden but not a literal claim that no patient left without being seen.

**Connection:** Pairs with staffing-report overflow and floating.

**Sources:** S22

### What are readmissions, patient experience, and overall stars?

**Status:** confirmed

Sunrise has 2 CMS stars. Two readmission-domain measures are worse and six no different. Heart-failure patients had 27 more days lost alive/out of hospital than average; pneumonia patients had 10.9 more. Lown patient satisfaction is D.

**Analysis:** The weakness is not generalized clinical failure. It clusters around return utilization and patient experience.

**Connection:** Strengthens the access and continuity-of-care narrative.

**Sources:** S19 · S21 · S23

### What do unsafe-staffing filings, grievances, and complaint themes show?

**Status:** confirmed

Sunrise’s reports document out-of-ratio assignments, capacity overflow, inpatient staff floated to ED/satellite areas, critical-care acuity pressure, and improving vacancy/objection counts. SEIU survey and worker statements repeat the staffing theme but are Tier 2.

**Analysis:** The pattern is corroborated across management and labor sources, while magnitude and shift-level causality remain unresolved.

**Connection:** The strongest cross-source safety finding on the page.

**Sources:** S16 · S17 · S18

## Community cost and public money

### What is the tax exemption versus community-benefit fair-share deficit?

**Status:** not-applicable

Sunrise is for-profit and does not receive a nonprofit hospital income-tax exemption. A Lown-style nonprofit fair-share deficit is not the correct test.

**Analysis:** Property abatements, credits, or development incentives could still exist but were not quantified.

**Connection:** Routes accountability away from nonprofit charity law and toward taxable-company subsidies and patient access.

**Sources:** S5

### What is the charity-care trend compared with 340B enrollment?

**Status:** not-applicable

HRSA says for-profit hospitals are ineligible for hospital 340B participation. A clean Sunrise charity-care trend was not extracted.

**Analysis:** The state’s $207.25m “community benefits” total includes subsidized services and other categories and is not equivalent to charity care.

**Connection:** Prevents two common money-type errors: 340B attribution and community-benefit/charity conflation.

**Sources:** S5 · S34

### After any closure, who lost access?

**Status:** not-applicable

No relevant current Sunrise service closure was established.

**Analysis:** ED access pressure is studied directly rather than attributed to an unproven closure.

**Connection:** Keeps downstream EMS analysis conditional on an actual closure event.

**Sources:** Phase 7

## Hospital spin — claims to test

### “We can’t find nurses.”

**Status:** partial

Sunrise’s filings show a 28% RN vacancy rate and 465 openings in 2022, improving to 5.77% and 63 openings by November 2024. Management reported substantial hiring, new graduates, externs, and reduced objections.

**Analysis:** The shortage narrative was credible during the vacancy spike and became less persuasive as recruitment improved. Market pay and posting duration were not tested.

**Connection:** A rare management explanation supported in part by its own later results.

**Sources:** S16 · S17

### “We invest in our community.”

**Status:** partial

Sunrise reported $207.25m in state-defined community benefits in 2023 and $47.30m of capital. The total is not charity care, and patient-suit practice remains unknown.

**Analysis:** The claim is plausible in a broad service-subsidy sense but cannot be used as a charity or affordability claim without category detail and collections records.

**Connection:** Pairs community-benefit accounting with the missing patient-debt docket.

**Sources:** S5

### “Patient safety is our top priority.”

**Status:** mixed

Current mortality and several safety measures are favorable, while Sunrise’s own reports document unit-level ratio/capacity pressure; CMS overall is 2 stars, Lown satisfaction is D, and DOJ settled an ADA access failure.

**Analysis:** The evidence supports real clinical strengths and real access failures. A slogan cannot collapse either side.

**Connection:** The clearest example of why headline grades and lived access can diverge.

**Sources:** S16 · S17 · S19–S23 · S25

### What did they know internally versus what they said publicly?

**Status:** partial

Internal/operational record: staffing committees knew of vacancies, overflow, floating, and out-of-ratio events. Public response: HCA cited national shortages and said staffing was safe, appropriate, and comparable. Nevada’s report also repeated a 2022 profit in narrative text beside a 2023 loss exhibit.

**Analysis:** The staffing statements may differ by scope rather than prove deception. The Nevada financial contradiction is definite, but authorship and intent are unresolved.

**Connection:** This is the best available knowledge-versus-statement timeline.

**Sources:** S5 · S16 · S17 · S18

## Accountability and what should change

### Which “supposed to’s” were broken?

**Status:** confirmed

The Shouldn’t Ledger identifies: Medicare billing requirements implicated by the OIG audit; ADA effective-communication obligations in the settled interpreter case; Clark County air-permit testing requirements; an open NLRA retaliation/surveillance allegation; inaccurate year framing inside Nevada’s report; and out-of-ratio/overflow assignments against the hospital’s staffing-plan process and professional norm.

**Analysis:** Each entry has a citable rule and legal status. Buybacks, executive pay, capital spending, and home-office allocations are not listed merely because they look bad.

**Connection:** Turns moral criticism into a rule-based accountability register.

**Sources:** S16 · S17 · S25 · S28 · S30 · S33

### Is this a pattern — same owner, landlord, vendors, or playbook elsewhere?

**Status:** partial

HCA has a documented historical national compliance record and a current disclosed capital-return model. Sunrise has its own OIG audit, ADA settlement, air penalty, staffing pressure, and labor record. No common landlord or vendor playbook was established.

**Analysis:** Owner-wide history informs credibility and comparison; it does not convert every Sunrise issue into recurrence of the old HCA fraud cases.

**Connection:** Supports a matched HCA peer study rather than anecdotal pattern matching.

**Sources:** S9 · S25 · S30 · S31 · S33

### Who has been telling the truth?

**Status:** mixed

Management is supported on aggregate hiring improvement and real vacancy pressure, but its broad safe-staffing language is narrowed by its own unit reports. SEIU’s direction of concern is corroborated, while survey magnitude remains Tier 2. OIG produced strong audit evidence, while “fraud” overstates legal posture. Nevada’s narrative year is wrong. CMS and Lown are both credible within different methodologies.

**Analysis:** Credibility is claim-specific. Friendly and hostile sources are scored against documents rather than accepted as teams.

**Connection:** The credibility register is the antidote to advocacy cherry-picking.

**Sources:** S5 · S6 · S16–S23 · S30

### What specific, citable demands follow?

**Status:** analysis

Publish Sunrise’s cash-pool and home-office allocation bridge; disclose unit/shift staffing and ADO data; name and trace all clinical/staffing/collections vendors; publish local governing-body membership and conflicts; report patient-debt litigation; reconcile Medicaid supplemental payments to assessments and patient benefit; publish ADA monitoring; attach enforceable transparency and staffing conditions to large public-payment programs.

**Analysis:** These demands target proven opacity and access mechanisms. They do not require proving insolvency, excess death, or PE ownership.

**Connection:** Moves from investigation to remedies without outrunning the evidence.

**Sources:** Dossier findings and Shouldn’t Ledger

### What would a rebuttal team attack first?

**Status:** confirmed

They would attack: the comparability of the $192.3m 2024 profit; the cash-pool inference; staffing adequacy despite RN growth; use of “fraud” for the OIG audit; conflicting safety grades; and comparison of parent capital returns with facility resources.

**Analysis:** The page protects each point: profit is labeled facility accounting; cash sweeps are unproven; RN growth and unit strain are both shown; OIG is not called fraud; grade methods are separated; parent money is used only to assess consolidated capacity.

**Connection:** This is the publication defense layer.

**Sources:** Phase 10 self-audit

## Source ledger

- [S1] [Nevada Secretary of State business registry](https://esos.nv.gov/EntitySearch/OnlineEntitySearch)
- [S2] [CMS teaching-hospital list / Open Payments identifiers](https://www.cms.gov/openpayments/program-participants/covered-recipients/teaching-hospitals)
- [S3] [NPPES NPI Registry API](https://npiregistry.cms.hhs.gov/api/?version=2.1&number=1861439952)
- [S4] [Federal court order describing Sunrise/HCA entity chain](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/nevada/nvdce/2:2016cv02273/117778/45/)
- [S5] [Nevada Report on Activities and Operations of Hospitals, Oct. 1, 2024](https://dhcfp.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/dhcfpnvgov/content/Pgms/SR/Report%20on%20Activities%20and%20Operations%20of%20Nevada%20Hospitals%20October%201,%202024.pdf)
- [S6] [Nevada Compare Care annual financial and utilization workbooks](https://nevadacomparecare.net/quarterly-reports)
- [S7] [U.S. Census QuickFacts — Clark County, Nevada](https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/clarkcountynevada/PST045225)
- [S8] [Definitive Healthcare — top HCA hospitals by net patient revenue](https://www.definitivehc.com/resources/healthcare-insights/top-hca-hospitals-net-patient-revenue)
- [S9] [HCA Healthcare 2023 Form 10-K](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/860730/000119312524044859/d558446d10k.htm)
- [S10] [Humana history/FAQ on 1993 Galen separation](https://humana.gcs-web.com/static-files/8089b815-ae87-4b77-bf26-5dab0d4614d7)
- [S11] [NEJM history of investor-owned hospital chains](https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJM199603143341111)
- [S12] [Sunrise tower project description](https://www.mccarthy.com/projects/sunrise-hospital-medical-center-patient-tower)
- [S13] [HCA 2020 results release](https://investor.hcahealthcare.com/news/news-details/2021/HCA-Healthcare-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-2020-Results/default.aspx)
- [S14] [HCA 2020 proxy statement](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/860730/000119312520086068/d857381ddef14a.htm)
- [S15] [HCA 2025 proxy statement reporting 2024 compensation](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/860730/000119312525054832/d880090ddef14a.htm)
- [S16] [Sunrise 2023 staffing committee report](https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/Documents/RTTL_NRS449.242_2023_Sunrise.pdf)
- [S17] [Sunrise 2024 staffing committee report](https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/Documents/RTTL_NRS449.242_2024_Sunrise.pdf)
- [S18] [SEIU 2022 HCA staffing survey](https://www.seiu.org/2022/01/new-national-survey-of-nurses-and-healthcare-workers-at-hca-hospitals-sounds-alarm-bells-nearly-80-percent-of-respondents-report-short-staffing-is-jeopardizing-patient-care-at-americas-largest-for-profit)
- [S19] [CMS Hospital General Information dataset](https://data.cms.gov/provider-data/dataset/xubh-q36u)
- [S20] [CMS Complications and Deaths dataset](https://data.cms.gov/provider-data/dataset/ynj2-r877)
- [S21] [CMS Unplanned Hospital Visits dataset](https://data.cms.gov/provider-data/dataset/632h-zaca)
- [S22] [CMS Timely and Effective Care dataset](https://data.cms.gov/provider-data/dataset/yv7e-xc69)
- [S23] [Lown Institute Hospitals Index — Sunrise](https://lownhospitalsindex.org/hospital/sunrise-hospital-and-medical-center/)
- [S35] [BMJ Open study of hospitals’ predatory billing practices](https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/12/7/e057606)
- [S24] [Las Vegas Review-Journal report on 2012 Sunrise position reductions](https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/sunrise-hospital-eliminates-144-positions/)
- [S25] [DOJ ADA settlement concerning Sunrise and HCA facilities](https://www.justice.gov/usao-nv/pr/justice-department-secures-agreement-sunrise-hospital-and-medical-center-ensure)
- [S26] [DOJ amicus brief describing Forsyth v. Humana billing allegations](https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/brief-united-states-amicus-curiae-9)
- [S27] [NLRB case search](https://www.nlrb.gov/search/case/28-RC-330552)
- [S28] [NLRB open charge search](https://www.nlrb.gov/search/case/28-CA-365427)
- [S29] [Labor-reporting account of Sunrise bargaining/picketing](https://peoplestribune.org/2025/06/18/sunrise-hospital-workers-picket-for-first-union-contract/)
- [S30] [HHS OIG recommendation tracker — Sunrise Hospital & Medical Center A-04-19-08075](https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/workplan/summary/wp-summary-0000938.asp)
- [S31] [DOJ — HCA settlement brings total government recovery to $1.7 billion](https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/June/03_civ_386.htm)
- [S32] [Nevada hospital supplemental-payment report, SFY2024](https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/Documents/RTTL_NRS422.2749_2024.pdf)
- [S33] [Clark County Air Quality hearing docket, Sunrise Hospital](https://www.clarkcountynv.gov/government/departments/environment_and_sustainability/division_of_air_quality/enforcement/hearing_officer_decisions.php)
- [S34] [HRSA 340B hospital eligibility](https://www.hrsa.gov/opa/eligibility-and-registration/hospitals)

## Additional current sources

- [HCA Healthcare 2025 Form 10-K](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/860730/000119312526044769/hca-20251231.htm)
- [Archived Sunrise Leapfrog grade, Spring 2021](https://web.archive.org/web/20210619181548/https://www.hospitalsafetygrade.org/h/sunrise-hospital-and-medical-center)
- [Current Sunrise Leapfrog grade history](https://www.hospitalsafetygrade.org/h/sunrise-hospital-and-medical-center)
- [Johns Hopkins/BMJ Open billing study](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9274508/)
- [Axios hospital billing interactive](https://www.axios.com/hospital-billing)
- [Nevada Current summary of Sunrise markup and court-action findings](https://nevadacurrent.com/briefs/sunrise-charges-nearly-13x-markup-one-of-highest-among-top-hospitals-study-shows/)